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Dynamic Complementarity in
Export Promotion: The Market Access
Program in Fruits and Vegetables
Timothy J. Richards and Paul M. Patterson
Government-supported  promotion in foreign markets may be justified when market
failures exist,  such  as spillover externalities,  where promotion  of one  commodity
positively  influences  exports  of  another,  or  when  market  uncertainties  cause
planning horizons to be shorter than the persistent effects of promotion. A dynamic
model of U.S. apple, almond, grape, and wine export supply is developed to test for
these market failures.  Promotion is viewed as an investment in establishing and
maintaining a product's  image.  Evidence supporting the existence  of each market
failure is found. Exporters and program administrators may fail to account for them
in export promotion  planning.
Key  words: cost-of-adjustment  model,  dynamic  duality,  dynamic  export  supply,
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Introduction
During debate over the 1996 Food and Agriculture  Improvement  and Reform  (FAIR)
Act, subsidized export promotion under what was then known as the Market Promotion
Program (MPP) came under sharp criticism as a prime example of"corporate welfare."
Critics maintain that if such promotion is economically viable, then there is no need for
government assistance.  However, supporters argue that there may be a public role for
such support if  two conditions are met. First, promotion must entail market failures that
cause private firms to underprovide export promotion compared to the socially optimal
level.  These  failures  must  be  specific  to  the  international  market  to  be  welfare-
increasing,  because  "international  policies  are  proper  only  when  an  international
distortion  exists  ... " (Baldwin,  p.  822).1  Second,  there  must be  a  compelling  public
interest in causing firms to promote more (Rauch). If addressing these market failures
results in a net benefit to society, then there may be a case for helping firms develop and
maintain markets for U.S. agricultural exports.
At least four types of market failure are possible. First, uncertainty over the level and
extent  of funding may cause firms to adopt  a short-term planning perspective,  even
though the effects of their promotion may last for many years (Dhalla). With this myopic
perspective, the net present value of any promotion investment will be lower than if a
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long-term perspective were adopted, so less promotion occurs.  Second, advertising may
create positive externalities  if promoting one good causes  exports  of another to rise.
Unless the products are  sold under a co-branding program, growers of the promoted
commodity do not include these "halo effects" in their decision to promote; thus they
underpromote  their  own  product  compared  to  the joint,  or  industry  optimal  level
(Dwyer).  Third,  promotion  provides  information  on product  availability,  price,  and
quality-information that can allow a market to more closely approximate the perfectly
competitive  ideal  (Nelson).  Although  market  efficiency  is  enhanced,  firms  are  not
compelled  to aid in this process, as there are no appropriable  benefits or rents to be
captured.  Fourth, if export promotion is successful in raising grower prices, then input
suppliers will be able to capture some of the rents, and governments will gain higher tax
revenue. This study develops a method of testing for the first two types of market failure
in an empirical model of trade.
Our methodology consists of specifying a dynamic model of trade that treats promo-
tion as an exporter's investment in establishing and maintaining a product's image in
a foreign market, herein called "product equity." The notion of product equity is akin to
Nerlove and Arrow's  concept of advertising contributing  to the "goodwill" associated
with a product. Adopting a supplier perspective in evaluating export promotion is not
meant to imply that traditional demand-side approaches are inherently wrong, but our
approach should offer an equally plausible, alternative explanation for why promotion
expenditures on different products may interact and why they may persist. With this
approach,  investment not only impacts sales of the exporter's own product, but other
products that are closely associated with that of the exporter's. For example, promotions
that emphasize a product's U.S. origin are also likely to have an effect on other products
identified with the U.S. in foreign markets. The effectiveness of a promotion investment
is likely to decline  slowly over time as buyers  are exposed  to rival ads, or consumers
simply forget the original message.
Consequently,  the primary  objective  of this  study is to determine  whether these
market failures exist and, if so, whether they are sufficient to justify public support of
export promotion. Simply demonstrating positive economic returns to promotion, as is
commonly  done, is not sufficient to conclude  that government assistance is justified.
Rather, for there to be a rationale for public export promotion, it must be the case that
such returns would not exist, or would be significantly lower in the absence of support.
To achieve this objective, we estimate the effect of export promotion expenditure in a
dynamic  dual model of sales for four major horticultural  products:  apples,  almonds,
grapes, and wine. Therefore,  a secondary objective of this study is to illustrate the types
of empirical results obtainable  with a dynamic  approach that are not provided with a
static model.
The study begins with a comparison of the dynamic, or "supply-side" model developed
here with existing  empirical  export-promotion  evaluation  methods. The  next section
describes the adjustment-cost rationale underlying the dynamic commodity promotion
model and derives an empirical specification consistent with this approach. The third
section describes the data and econometric procedures used in estimating the dynamic
export  supply  system,  followed  by  a  presentation  and  discussion  of the estimation
results.  The  final  section  draws  some  conclusions  and  implications  from  these
results and suggests  some limitations of this analysis and possible avenues for future
research.
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An Adjustment Cost Model
of Export Supply and Promotion
Recent analyses of the effectiveness  of export promotion consider its role in expanding
foreign  consumers'  import  demand  for the  promoted  commodity  (Comeau,  Mittel-
hammer,  and Wahl;  Halliburton  and Henneberry;  Solomon and  Kinnucan;  Rosson,
Hammig,  and Jones;  Love, Porras,  and  Shumway; Alston  et al.; and many  others).
Although this approach has proven popular and valuable in quantifying the impact of
promotion on demand, there are a few reasons why it is not the only way to model trade
in agricultural products. First, the decision to enter export markets usually is not made
directly in response to demand from foreign consumers, but rather originates  from  a
perception among growers that domestic production has outgrown the domestic market's
ability to maintain acceptable  price levels (Elwell).  This is particularly true for U.S.
fruits and vegetables  where increased production threatens to create surpluses in the
domestic market.
Second,  treating promotion  as an argument  of consumers' utility functions  is not
necessarily universally accepted.  For example, Stigler and Becker feel that doing so is
arbitrary,  unnecessary,  and lacking  in analytical  power.  Contrary  to  utility-based
arguments,  Stigler and Becker maintain that advertising changes consumption simply
by  reducing  the "full  cost"  of buying a  promoted  good.  Third,  considering  the vast
number of products about which consumers are expected to maintain specific knowledge,
describing the dynamics of promotion in terms of a firm's investment in a depreciating
capital stock of goodwill, product equity, or reputation (Nerlove and Arrow) is at least
as plausible  as including it in a consumer's utility function. Finally,  many goods are
demanded  not  by  foreign  consumers,  but by  firms,  as intermediate  inputs  in  the
production  of final  goods  (Davis and Jensen).  Thus  this study offers  an alternative
approach  by treating export  promotion as an input to U.S.  producers' export  supply
decision.
Many other studies adopt a similar perspective by looking at promotion from the firm,
rather  than  consumer,  perspective.  Telser  considers  the  advertising  message  an
inextricable component of the product itself, arguing that promotion and the product are
joint outputs in supply. Alternatively, Ehrlich and Fisher treat promotion expenditure
explicitly as an input to production.  With their approach, the stock of product equity
depreciates over time, so the demand for promotion arises as a derived demand within
a dynamic profit-maximization problem. Their solution to this problem, however,  does
not allow for adjustment costs. Such costs are likely to be significant in establishing and
maintaining product equity since competitive  pressures, quality problems,  or service
disruptions require a continual commitment of personnel, advertising copy, and public
relations expenditure. If product equity is indeed costly to adjust, then the demand for
promotion is  more appropriately  considered (as Little  suggests) as the demand for a
quasi-fixed input to production (Mortensen; Treadway;  Howard and Shumway  1988).
Treating  product  equity as a quasi-fixed  input  offers  an explanation  for promotion
dynamics that is well grounded in firm optimizing behavior.
Beyond these appealing conceptual  features, this approach also provides  a natural
framework within which to test the quasi-fixity of promotion, the significance  of spill-
overs from promoting one commodity to another (or the halo effect), and the direct effect
of promoting a commodity on its own sales. First, estimates of the adjustment rate of
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each commodity's stock of product equity are obtained directly by specifying the cost-of-
adjustment model in terms  of a multivariate  flexible  accelerator (MVFA).  If product
equity does not  adjust to its steady state instantaneously  (within one  period), then
single-period planning horizons for promotion expenditure are suboptimal. Second, the
MVFA adjustment-rate parameters show not only the proportion each quasi-fixed input
adjusts toward its steady-state level given deviations from its own long-run level, but
also the effect of disequilibria among all other quasi-fixed inputs (Mortensen). Epstein
and Denny define dynamic complementarity as the case where a deficient stock of one
quasi-fixed input causes  a reduction in the rate of adjusting another. The logic in this
case is reasonably intuitive-if the marginal value product of one input rises in the level
of a second, insufficient stocks of the latter cause demand for the first to fall.
The empirical implications of this phenomenon for export promotion are described in
greater detail below. In addition to these potential long-run spillover effects, the model
estimates  short-run interactions  by including  all cross-promotion  variables  in each
supply equation. However, solving a dynamic optimization problem that yields these
multiple output supply and quasi-fixed input demand equations is virtually impossible
from a primal perspective.
Consequently, we derive the demand for promotion and the supply of exports using
the  dynamic  dual framework  of Epstein-as  applied  to agricultural  investment  by
Howard and  Shumway  (1988),  or to investment in the food processing  industry by
Morrison. With this approach, if firms maximize the present  value of future profits
subject to a single-period production constraint and a dynamic constraint on the rate of
adjusting quasi-fixed inputs, then the maximized objective function of the firm can be
written in terms of a dual value function. The dual value function expresses the present
value of the firm as a function of input prices, output prices, rental rates of quasi-fixed
inputs, and current quasi-fixed input stocks. Applying a dynamic analog of Hotelling's
lemma to a  value  function  of a  specific  functional  form generates  estimable  input
demand, output supply, and investment demand equations.
In terms of the export promotion decision, however, it is common to consider input
quantities  as  predetermined  (Lawrence).  Therefore,  the  problem  facing  exporters
(primarily private  firms) is to choose  their own  promotion  expenditure  levels  and,
subject to export promotion program regulations,  the amount of support to apply for
from the U.S. Department of Agriculture/Foreign Agricultural Service (USDA/FAS) in
order to maximize grower revenue net of promotion costs. Conceptually, this means that
the relevant objective function is neither a profit nor a cost function, but a net revenue
function instead. Further, the fact that product  equity is costly  to adjust in foreign
countries means that the revenue function is constrained by the process governing the
change in equity over time. An exporter's objective is, therefore, to maximize the present
value of net export revenue-net of the cost of adjusting the stock of product equity. The
dynamic dual arguments made by Epstein apply as equally to the dual revenue function
as they do to the dual profit or cost functions more common to the literature, provided
that the equivalent regularity conditions are satisfied.
One potential problem in the empirical estimation of this model is obtaining separate
data  on commodities  bought for export  (inputs)  and the amounts  actually exported
(outputs). By assuming current-period exports are composed of predetermined levels of
production, however, current output is a function of the last period's input endowment.
Given this argument, the dual value function, assuming the decision maker maximizes
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the present value of future export net revenue over an infinite horizon,  can be written
as:
(1)  J(p, q, x,  z)  = max  f  e  rt[p'y(x,  z)  - C(I)  - q'z] dt
Ij,y  O
s.t.:  z  = Ij-  6z,  z(0)  = z,  z(t)>  V t;
J(p, q, x,  z)  < f  e-rt(pLyL)dt,
where J  is the optimal present value of net export revenues,  qj is the rental rate of
quasi-fixed input zj, r is a real interest rate, p is a vector of output prices, y is a vector
of export quantities, x is a vector of input endowments, Ij is the gross rate of investing
in quasi-fixed inputj, and 6 is a constant rate of depreciation. In order for J to meet the
regularity conditions required for dynamic duality (Epstein), the value function, among
other conditions, must be homogeneous and convex in output prices, output supply must
be monotonically increasing in output price, and the shadow value of z must be non-
negative for positive adjustments (investment), and nonpositive for disinvestments. In
the empirical section to follow we evaluate these conditions.
Assuming CI > 0,  CI >  0,  and J is continuous and twice differentiable, then solving
(1)  provides the Bellman equation:
(2)  rJ(p, q, x, z)  = max[p'y(x,  z)  - C(I)  - q'z  + Jzl].
I
In order to apply the envelope theorem to (2), the necessary conditions for a solution to
(2) are used to simplify expressions that show how the optimal value function changes
in output and quasi-fixed input prices (Stefanou et al.). The first-order conditions for a
solution require: -CI =  Jz.  Next,  differentiating  (2)  with respect to the output price
vector gives the following:
(3)  rJp =  y*(x, z)  - C(aI/ap)  +Jzp  + J(aI/ap),
which, after substituting the necessary conditions for a revenue maximum and solving
for optimal output supply, gives:
(4)  y*(x, z)=rJp - Jzz.
Similarly, differentiating the Bellman equation with respect to quasi-fixed input rental
rates yields:
(5)  rJq = CI(aI/aq)  - z  + Jz(aI/aq)  + jzq.
Again substituting the first-order conditions into (5) and solving for the optimal rate of
investing in quasi-fixed inputs leads to an investment demand equation of the form:
(6)  z*  = Jz-[rJq+  ], (6)±  zq  [rJq +z],
which can be estimated simultaneously with (4) after specifying a functional form for J.
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Empirical Model of Export Supply
Provided that the functional form of the value function is chosen such that the shadow
values of promotion  (Jz) are  linear in q, then the investment demand  equations  are
interpreted in terms of the MVFA model. One plausible functional form that gives this
result is the Generalized  Leontief (GL) of Diewert. This functional form is widely used
in empirical dynamic dual studies because it is inherently homogeneous in prices,  is a
second-order  approximation  to  an arbitrary  technology,  and  is  affine  in the  state
variables without restricting Jzz = 0. In terms of the variables in this application, the
value function is written:
(7)  J(p,q,x,z)  =  p'A  z  + qBqzz  + p/2'  ql/2
+ q 1/2'D  ql 2 + pl/2 'Epp 1/2 + [p q']  x,
Fqx
where p and q are output and quasi-fixed input prices (rental rates), respectively; A, B,
C,  D,  E,  and F  are conformable  parameter matrices;  and  z  is a vector  of stocks of
product equity. Applying equations (4) and (6) to this specification generates the follow-
ing estimable output supply and investment demand equations:
(8)  Yi(p,  ,  x, z)  = E  Ai(rzt  - -)
j
+ r  rZ  k(12  (q a1/2
+ rP  2  Eii  +  +(r/2)Z  Cij  . +  Filxl
zi  Pi)l  J  Pi  I
and
(9)  iZ(p, q, x, z)  rzj  +  Bj  zt, m + E  F  + (r/2)  Cim  ,
+ 2  (Djm(jC)  +D  ) n2E  D  r  m m
In a model of dynamic adjustment, both long- and short-run elasticities are of interest.
For current purposes, short-run elasticities are defined as conditional on existing levels
of each quasi-fixed input; so they are, in effect, fixed inputs. In the long run, on the other
hand, steady-state quasi-fixed input stocks respond to changes in prices, promotion, or
other elements of the x vector in (9). Long-run elasticities, therefore, take into account
the effects of price changes on both current supply and future changes in supply induced
by changes in quasi-fixed  input stocks. In particular, the long-run price elasticity of
supply  is found  by solving  for the steady-state  level  of quasi-fixed  inputs  from  (9),
substituting the result into (8), and then deriving the response of supply to changes in
price:
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(10)  Eipi  apI  i)
a  zI  ' 
r .E  r  qj  Pi AU(  E  C  i  C1  (4  Z  Pi aPi  2Pi  k  Pi  4Pi  i  Pi  Yi)
where
az*/api = -(r  + Bji)-l(r/4pi) Bjm  Cim(Pi/qm ) 1 /2
m  i
and zj* is the  steady-state  level of quasi-fixed input j.  Similarly,  the short-run price
elasticity of supply is simply this expression absent the adjustment in zj*. Promotion
elasticities in the short and long runs are also of considerable  interest.
In fact, the purpose of estimating a dynamic model of trade promotion is to be able to
differentiate between the long- and short-run effects of promotion. Equation (8) shows
how these two effects differ in terms of the model parameters.  Whereas sales respond
directly to promotion  in the current period  (as shown  by the A parameter  matrix),
estimates of the long-run effect take into account both sluggish adjustment of accumu-
lated promotion stocks  and interactions  with stocks  of other  commodities'  goodwill.
These effects are shown in the speed-of-adjustment parameters in B. More specifically,
short-run responsiveness is expressed as the elasticity of export supply with respect to
current-period investments in promotion-I,  in equation (1) above:  ESRj  = -Aij(zlyi).
In contrast, the long-run response to advertising takes into account the fact that invest-
ments in the current period continue to influence sales in all future periods through the
stock of goodwill,  so the elasticity of exports with respect to promotion expenditures,
after allowing for stocks to adjust to their steady states, is written:
LR,i j =  Aj(jr  + Bij)  (zi*/yj),
where 6j = 1 if  i =j, and  =0 if i #j. Both short- and long-run elasticities are evaluated
at variable means. In fact, the parameters of B are of considerable interest in their own
right, as they indicate the nature and significance of the interactions when promoting
different commodities.
As such, these interactions provide a means of testing the degree of complementarity
or substitutability  between  commodity-promotion  programs.  In terms of the MVFA
model, the own- and cross-adjustment rates comprise the speed-of-adjustment  matrix
in equation (9) with typical element:
(11)  Zi  = Mi[z  - z*]  =(Bii  + r)[zi - zi*]  +  Bij[zj - z]  V i,j,
where z*  is the steady-state level of the ith quasi-fixed input. Equation (11) shows the
adjustment of each quasi-fixed input to its long-run equilibrium in response to its own,
and other quasi-fixed inputs' deviations from their long-run equilibria. For example, if
the current level of zj is greater than its steady-state level, then a positive Bij suggests
that the rate of investing in zi will rise. In other words, if two quasi-fixed  inputs are
dynamic complements,  then higher stocks  of one cause the marginal productivity  of
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investing in the other to rise. As a result, the marginal benefit of adjusting the stock of
this  input  is  higher,  justifying  a  higher  equilibrium  cost  (and  hence  speed)  of
adjustment. In the current example, building up the equity in one product may cause
the  equity of another to improve  faster if their promotion investments  are comple-
mentary.  Such complementarity,  if it exists, constitutes one  piece of evidence  of the
external or halo effect of export promotion. To test for both the direct and indirect effects
of export promotion, export sales and promotion data for a set of related products to a
common set of importers are required.
Data and Methods
Due to the complexity of the empirical model described above, care is taken to keep the
specification  as  parsimonious  as  possible,  while  including  a  sufficient  number  of
products to illustrate any cross-commodity effects that may or may not exist. Ultimately,
the selection of a representative set of commodities is driven both by these concerns and
by practical matters as well. For this application, export volumes and values are taken
from Foreign Agricultural Trade of the  United States (FATUS), maintained by  the
Foreign  Agricultural  Service  of  the  USDA,  but  collected  by  the  Department  of
Commerce. These data, however, provide only annual observations  from 1984-95,  so
must be pooled over a cross-section of importers common to each commodity in order to
generate sufficient degrees of freedom to estimate the model.2 The set of commodities
exported  to each  of the countries  in this group during  the sample period consists of
apples, almonds,  grapes, and wine;  the importers  include Mexico,  Sweden, Norway,
Finland, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines,
and Japan.3
Prices for these commodities are calculated as unit-value indices from the value and
volume  data reported  in FATUS and, because  we model  export  supply rather than
import demand, are retained as U.S. dollars. These prices vary both over time and over
export market.4 Despite concerns over the effect of product quality on unit-value indices
constructed from FOB price data (Shiells; Feenstra; Feenstra and Shiells; Davis), no
data exist that allow the appropriate adjustments to be made. Because of the relatively
short sample period, and the nature of the products analyzed, such changes in quality
are likely to induce only  small bias. Promotion  expenditures under  the USDA/FAS-
administered Foreign  Market  Development  (FMD) and Targeted  Export Assistance
(TEA) programs, and the Market Promotion Program (MPP) were provided by Foreign
Agricultural Service staff. All data are scaled prior to estimation. Although the data to
2 Estimates of the dynamic dual model were found to be sensitive to the choice of sample period. However, truncating the
sample to 1984-93 caused only  1.7% of the key parameters  (in matrices A, B,  C, D,  and E) to change sign. Moreover, the
correlation between  the sets of parameters was 0.842.
3 With the diversity of fruit and vegetable importers, this necessarily excludes some important commodities that flow to
only one or two principal buyers.
4 While "the law of one  price" may hold for more homogeneous,  bulk commodities,  apples are quite different. Given that
they are perishable, transportation costs mean that inter-country arbitrage is not likely to occur. Second, local tastes differ
considerably among countries, with the "U.S. premium" being far smaller in some countries than others. Third, institutional
relationships with produce buyers in each country and between buyers in these countries often serve as an effective barrier
to perfect market integration. Finally, export market officials at the Washington Apple Commission (Elwell) assure us that
such interspatial price differences represented  in these data are entirely  plausible.
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this point are commonly used in export promotion studies, calculating different rental
prices for each commodity's stock of product equity is a problem unique to a dynamic
dual approach.
Ehrlich and Fisher, however, have developed  a method for measuring the user cost
of what they term "advertising capital." With this method, the commodity-specific user
cost vector,  or q in this example, is a function of both the price of advertising services
and the cost of capital:
(12)  q  =P(  + r-  Pa
) ,
where Pa is the price of advertising services,  6 is the rate of capital depreciation, r is a
vector of weighted average  costs of capital  (WACC) for each commodity,  and Pa is the
capital  gains  associated  with  a  change  in  the  price  of  advertising.  An  index  of
advertising cost is constructed from media cost indexes provided by McCann-Erickson
Co. In the absence  of data on specific advertising programs  used by each commodity
board,  a  simple  average  of  print  and  broadcast  media  cost  indexes  is  used.  The
depreciation rate, 6, is assumed to be common to all commodities and is estimated using
a maximum-likelihood  grid-search procedure described below, while the capital gains
term, Pa, is assumed to be constant in the absence of specific data to the contrary.
Although each element of q to this point is constant across all commodities, the cost
of capital  is  commodity-dependent.  As  in  Stefanou  et al.,  the WACC  consists  of a
weighted average of farm debt interest and cost of equity capital. Weights on each type
of capital for the fruit and nut growers in this example are assumed to be the same for
all growers in the U.S., and so are taken from the USDA/Economic  Research Service
"Farm Business Balance Sheet" data files-and, of course, vary on a year-to-year basis.
The debt interest rate refers to the average  rate on farm debt and is taken from the
WEFA database. Assuming agricultural capital markets are in equilibrium, the cost of
equity capital is equal to its return (Weston, Besley, and Brigham).  In this application,
the average return to equity for growers  of a specific commodity is unobservable,  and
so is proxied by the export margin, or the difference between export and grower prices
expressed in percentage terms.
Given the likely endogeneity of these margins, the model is estimated with an instru-
mental variables procedure (NL3SLS) where the set of instruments includes lagged total
production  of each  commodity,  lagged  grower prices,  lagged export  prices, and  each
importer's  Consumer  Price  Index  (CPI),  population,  exchange  rate,  and per  capita
disposable income. Importer data are obtained from International  Financial  Statistics,
published by the International  Monetary Fund.  To improve estimation efficiency,  the
data are pooled over sample countries, and each intercept is allowed to vary by country.
After scaling the data to improve convergence  speed, the system of four output supply
and quasi-fixed input demand equations is estimated with convexity and symmetry as
maintained hypotheses, given the results of testing these conditions described below.
Rather  than arbitrarily  specify a  depreciation  rate  for product  equity,  this study
follows Ehrlich and Fisher by recognizing that it is indeed a parameter to be estimated.5
5 The depreciation rate cannot be estimated simultaneously with the rest of the system parameters because net investment
is unobservable  when the depreciation  rate is unknown.  As in Ehrlich  and Fisher,  therefore,  this grid-search  procedure
estimates both the unobservable stock of product equity and the investment demand parameters.
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With their method, estimates of the depreciation rate are obtained using a maximum-
likelihood grid-search procedure.  Searching over 0.001 increments  of size provides an
optimal depreciation rate of 0.921, implying a relatively rapid decay of product equity.6
This depreciation  rate is maintained while testing both the regularity conditions  for
duality and hypotheses regarding the effectiveness, durability, and spillovers associated
with export promotion expenditure.
Results and Discussion
The first set of results concerns the regularity conditions required by dynamic duality
in general, and the MVFA model in particular. Although likelihood-ratio tests assess the
symmetry and convexity of the value function, monotonicity of the investment demand
and export supply function is determined by inspecting the sign of each fitted equation
at each data point.7 In terms  of the empirical  model  shown in (8)  and (9),  convexity
requires all elements of the C matrix, and the off-diagonal  elements of D and E to be
nonpositive, while  symmetry requires Di  = Dji, and Eij = Ej, for all i and j.  Further, if
each quasi-fixed input adjusts instantaneously with respect to its own disequilibrium,
and independently  of disequilibria in the other quasi-fixed inputs, then the MVFA is
misspecified. Instantaneous adjustment means that Bi  = -1,  and Bi  = 0 for quasi-fixed
input i, while independent adjustment of quasi-fixed input i implies Byi  = 0, and Bji = 0
for allj quasi-fixed inputs.8 Table  1 presents the results from likelihood-ratio  tests of
each of these hypotheses.
As shown in table 1, the dynamic export supply specification is consistent with both
convexity  and symmetry of the value function. Thus these theoretical conditions  are
maintained while testing for instantaneous and independent quasi-fixed input adjust-
ment. Failure to reject both of these hypotheses suggests that a static empirical model
may be sufficient for this problem. However, in both commodity-by-commodity and joint
tests of instantaneous adjustment, the null hypothesis is rejected (table 1). Rejecting
instantaneous adjustment means that investments in product equity through promotion
expenditure have multi-period effects that would be ignored by adopting a single-period
promotion planning horizon.  Hence, conditional on the estimated depreciation rate of
existing stocks  of product equity,  these results support the possibility of a dynamic
externality to export promotion.
Further, these results also suggest rejecting hypotheses  of independent adjustment
for  each quasi-fixed  input.  To  determine  whether this interdependence  means  that
the product equities of a pair of goods are dynamic complements (Bi  > 0) or substitutes
(Byi  < 0), it is necessary  to conduct t-tests  on individual parameters.  In this context,
6  A reviewer expressed concern over the dependence of all estimated parameters on this depreciation rate. While it is true
that all parameters are conditional on this value, few of the key elasticities or input-adjustment rates change qualitatively,
or change sign, for depreciation rates in the vicinity of the optimal rate.
7 While monotonicity in output supply simply requires supply to be positive for positive prices, investment demand must
be negative when the dynamic multiplier (Jqizi) is negative,  and positive when the multiplier is positive.
8 Note that these conditions  differ from those  defined by Howard and Shumway  (1988),  who require only the diagonal
element  of B =  -1.0  for instantaneous  adjustment,  and all off-diagonal elements  to be zero for independent  adjustment.
However, this definition of instantaneous  adjustment does not allow for quasi-fixity with respect to disequilibria in other
inputs. Further, independent adjustment is more meaningful if defined in terms of the response  of ith quasi-fixed input to
disequilibria in each of the other inputs, rather than both its response and its effect on other inputs' adjustment rates.
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Table  1.  Results of Tests of Dynamic Duality and MVFA Conditions
Null Hypothesis  Likelihood Ratio  Critical X 2 a
1.  Convexity  28.971  55.470
2.  Symmetry  9.665  21.026
3.  Convexity and  Symmetry  44.345  55.470
4.  Instantaneous Adjustment:
(a)  Apples  1,957.529  9.488
(b)  Almonds  4,225.844  9.488
(c)  Grapes  1,716.893  9.488
(d)  Wine  8,850.176  9.488
(e)  All products  15,686.130  26.296
5.  Independent Adjustment:
(a)  Apples  2,506.427  12.592
(b)  Almonds  702.884  12.592
(c)  Grapes  2,723.307  12.592
(d)  Wine  1,874.994  12.592
(e)  All products  2,953.482  21.026
a  Critical X 2values are calculated  at the 5%  level of significance.
finding significant complementarity provides some evidence of the notion of a dynamic
halo effect for export promotion. This means that the establishment  of a reputation for
one product  may help to build product  equity in other products  with characteristics
common to the first. Because promoters of the first product are not likely to take these
spillovers into account, a case may be made for external effects to commodity promotion.
Although spillovers and slow adjustment may be  statistically  significant, table 2
provides  estimates of their quantitative,  or economic  significance.  In particular, this
table provides estimates of M, the speed-of-adjustment matrix. To retrieve the elements
of M, an input's own-adjustment rate is found by adding a constant rate of interest to
the diagonal  elements of B,  while the cross-adjustment effect  of a disequilibrium in
stockj on the rate of adjusting stock i is given by the element Bi. Assuming a constant
real interest rate of 3%,  stocks of apple goodwill adjust  15% toward their steady state
each period, implying a total lag time of 6.67 years. Similarly, the own-adjustment rates
for each of the other commodities  are 7.4%, 54.1%,  and 1.7% for almonds, grapes, and
wine, respectively.
Clearly, the implausibly long adjustment periods implied by the almond and wine
results in particular suggest that these results should be interpreted with some caution,
reflecting  the  fragility  of dynamic  duality  estimates  cited  elsewhere  (Howard  and
Shumway  1989). These decay times, however,  may be due to the length of the sample
period. With 11 years of data, many commodity exporters are still growing their inter-
national  product equity,  so have  not yet experienced  periods  of decline.  With  these
caveats in mind, our findings suggest that grape promotion, and the image  it creates,
dissipates rapidly; yet favorable impressions of U.S. wine tend to endure quite well in
international markets. In terms of the off-diagonal  elements of B, the results in table
2 show that some pairs of commodities are dynamic complements, whereas others are
dynamic substitutes.
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Table 2.  Dynamic Dual Export Supply System Parameter Estimates, 1984-95
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Log-likelihood function  =  -7,145.729
Notes: An asterisk (*) denotes significance  at the 5% level. Convexity and symmetry are imposed prior to
estimation. The estimation method used is NL3SLS. Parameter subscripts are defined as follows: 1 = apples,
2 = almonds,  3 = grapes, and 4 = wine.
Currently, export  promotion  allocations  are made  on the implicit  assumption  of
substitutability-i.e., that promoting one product reduces the productivity of promoting
another.  This  argument  forms the  basis  for maintaining that promotion  should  be
conducted only by private firms in competition for limited foreign produce market share.































330  December 1998Dynamic Complementarity in Export Promotion  331
indeed complement apple promotion, a fact that is likely overlooked in determining the
amount of export promotion by almond and wine export organizations and the Foreign
Agricultural  Service.
To better understand this result, recall that complementarity occurs when one type
of promotion makes another more effective-if the message for one type of product acts
to reinforce  that used  for another.  The  most common  example  of this is where two
promoters  use a "buy USA" theme to draw on Asian consumers' preference  for things
American. Buyers may not remember the exact product being advertised, but are likely
to recall the more generic appeal  to a preference  that they already possess.  Similar
complementarities  exist between grape and almond promotion, across apple, almond,
and grape promotion, and between grape and wine promotion.
Many of these interaction terms appear to be not just statistically, but economically
significant. For example, if the stock of grape product equity is below its steady-state
level, then the accumulation of wine equity is slowed by over 35% each period. Although
the  estimated magnitude  of this effect  may appear  to be implausibly  high, the logic
behind its direction (complementarity) is sound. Consider a year in which grape prices
are relatively high. With strong export prices, the desired level of grape product equity
will be high. The costs of mounting an intensive promotional program, however, mean
that the current level of equity will be somewhat below the desired level for a period of
time. Missing the opportunity to promote  grapes heavily when their demand is high
leads  to  an additional  failure  to  capitalize  on  promoting  products  associated  with
grapes-wine in particular.  If grape equity is adjusted instantly to its optimal level,
then each  dollar of wine promotion would  be  more productive.  Although the  cross-
adjustment parameters  indicate the direction  and  strength of product  equity inter-
actions, estimating the total elasticities of promotion in the short and long run provides
a better measure of the extent of the cross-promotion effect, not just on other products'
equity, but on export sales levels.
These elasticities, shown in table 3, combine the direct effect of promotion on exports
and the indirect effect on exports working through the interaction of equity stocks cited
above. In fact, the short-run elasticities show that the direct effect may be an important
factor in determining  export  sales,  with two  of the four own-promotion  elasticities
greater than one. In these two cases, apples and wine, a 1% increase in export promotion
expenditure causes a 5% and a 2% increase in exports, respectively.  In contrast, a 1%
increase in export promotion for almonds is associated with only a 0.052% increase in
short-run exports.
In the short run, however, the spillover effects from other commodities' promotion
can exert as great an influence as own-commodity promotion. For example, a 1% rise in
apple promotion causes almond sales to rise by 0.22%-albeit a small effect, it is none-
theless greater than almonds' own-promotion elasticity. Promoting almonds, grapes, and
wine also has a strong effect  on apple exports,  with two  of the four cross-promotion
elasticities greater than 1.0. While there appears to be a broad agreement between these
direct, or single-period  complementarities  and the dynamic  complementarities  cited
above, this does not necessarily have to be the case. To illustrate, grape promotion has
a strong direct effect  on apple exports, but is a  dynamic substitute in terms of more
durable stocks of product equity or goodwill. Such examples of positive short-run, cross-
promotion effects coexisting with negative dynamic interactions suggest that spillover
effects between promotion programs in these cases may be effective in generating new
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sales, but do not necessarily help develop lasting, favorable images for other products.
Combining the direct effect of promotion with its indirect effect on the productivity of
other goods' promotion is accomplished by estimating long-run elasticities.
As other dynamic dual studies have found (Howard and Shumway  1988; Vasavada
and Ball; Weersink and Howard), these long-run elasticity estimates are consistent with
the Le Chatelier-Samuelson  principle, namely that long-run promotion elasticities are
larger in absolute value than their short-run counterparts. In fact, if the estimated own-
adjustment rates are interpreted as being roughly accurate, the relative durability of
both apple and wine product equity causes their long-run promotion elasticities to be
many times larger than in the short run. While this effect is likely obvious to commodity
groups that have developed a strong "buy USA" brand image over time, there is little
incentive  to take the differences  between  short-  and long-run  cross-promotion  elas-
ticities  into account  in deciding how much  and where to advertise.  Despite caveats
regarding the robustness of the empirical estimates, these differences are identified only
in a multi-output dynamic model, because products can be either dynamic complements
or dynamic substitutes.
This distinction is important because two products that are dynamic substitutes in
terms of their stocks of product equity can exhibit a positive direct spillover  effect to
promotion, but a negative long-term effect, and vice versa. If developing a reputation for
one product reduces the effectiveness of promoting another, then it may even be the case
that  these  long-run  effects  come  to  dominate  the  short-run  or  direct  effects.  Such
negative promotion externalities  argue against subsidizing the promotion of products
that extend a negative image to associated products. As shown by the results in table
3, this is the case for relatively few commodity pairs: wine supply with respect to apple
promotion,  apple  supply with respect  to grape  promotion,  and  almond  supply  with
respect to apple and wine promotion. Although calculating the net external costs and
benefits of these dynamic promotion effects is beyond the scope of this study, if they are
indeed  genuine,  then  such  considerations  should  be  taken  into  account  in  future
program evaluations. Admittedly, many of these cross-promotion effects are implausible
in magnitude, but they fulfill one of the goals of this study, namely, demonstrating the
type of information obtainable from this approach that is not provided in a static model.
The dynamic dual modeling framework also provides estimates of both short- and
long-run price elasticities (table 3). Perhaps, as expected, due to the model's consistency
with the curvature conditions required for dynamic duality, all long-run elasticities of
supply are positive and significantly different from zero. These estimates suggest that
all exports are inelastic in supply, ranging from 0.534 for wine to 0.027 for almonds.
Although there are no elasticities in the literature with which we can compare these
results, they appear  to be reasonable  given the relative importance  of institutional,
infrastructure,  and domestic market constraints on the amount traded. Similarly, the
short-run elasticities appear reasonable due to a practical inability to increase export
supplies within one year, but require considerably more latitude to divert supplies from
the domestic market given sufficient time to adjust. When estimating the effectiveness
of promotion from an import demand perspective, it is common to draw implications for
likely advertising performance from estimates of the price elasticity of demand. Speci-
fically,  products  that are  less  elastic in demand  are  thought  to be  more effectively
differentiated  from  rival products,  so  respond  more  readily  to  efforts  designed  to
reinforce habitual purchases, or invite new users (Tirole).
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This analysis permits a similar argument to be advanced on the supply side. Assum-
ing world market demand for each product is elastic, products with less elastic export
supply are expected to benefit proportionately more (in terms of increased export sales)
from a given rise in export promotion. Although only an indirect test, and conditional
on the quality of the estimates comprising the elasticity, the results in table 3 provide
weak evidence of this connection; almonds are the least elastic in supply, yet show the
lowest elasticity of supply with respect to promotion. In fact, the empirical relationship
between supply and promotion elasticities appears to be the opposite-products with a
higher  price elasticity  of supply  (wine and  apples) are  also  the most responsive  to
promotion. This result demonstrates that the intuition taken from simple static models
of export supply may  no longer  apply in a dynamic, multi-commodity  framework.  If
promotion expenditure decisions are to be made optimally, they must take into account
both these own-product price elasticities and any significant cross-commodity effects.
Although individual exporters of  these relatively diverse products seem to have little
ability to influence the supply of the other products, market development  efforts for
many commodities often occur together due to economic or institutional changes in the
importing country. Further, the fact that decisions regarding promotion often are made
through trade associations, multi-product cooperatives, and the FAS itself, creates the
likelihood for significant interactions in supply.  Indeed,  in the majority of cases, the
cross-elasticity of supply is both numerically small and statistically insignificant,  but
some notable exceptions arise. In particular, apples and almonds appear to be substi-
tutes in supply and grapes substitute for apples. However, the relationship between
apples and grapes is not symmetric, since increasing  apple prices cause grape export
supplies  to rise. Thus these products are joint, or complements  in supply. Recall that
this price complementarity is consistent with results regarding the dynamic adjustment
of product  equity-a  deficient stock  of apple  equity (z1 < z  ) causes  grape equity  to
adjust slower than it otherwise would, so they are also dynamic promotion complements.
Knowledge  of such complementarities,  if borne out with further research using other
commodity  and  country  groups,  may help  direct future  allocations  of public  export
promotion funds.
Given that this study provides evidence of positive externalities to export promotion
both over time and across commodities, the question of how to make most efficient use
of the limited funds available from either public or private sources becomes the primary
issue.  This research  provides  at least tentative  support for public interest in export
promotion, but does not necessarily suggest that the most efficient solution is a contin-
uation of the current means of providing this support. Subsidies for export promotion
are but one way in which exporters can be made to internalize the benefits over time
and  to  other  commodities  of their promotion  efforts.  Arising  in the private  sector,
greater coordination between trade associations and individual commodity groups may
help  exporters  recognize  the  synergies  available  from  developing  specific  foreign
markets for complementary  products in tandem. In fact, removing the "policy uncer-
tainty" that surrounds re-funding federal  export promotion programs  each year may
serve to reduce the dynamic externality found herein. However, as is the case with any
government  program, rent-seeking  activities by potential beneficiaries  may serve to
usurp all potential benefits to society.9
9  The authors wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for  suggesting this point.
334  December 1998Dynamic Complementarity in Export Promotion  335
Conclusions  and Implications
Debate  continues  to surround  public  funding  for commodity  export promotion.  For
there to be a justifiable  economic  rationale  for policy  support, the market for export
development must fail in some significant way. This study tests for two such failures:
(a) multi-period benefits to promotion that exporters  do not consider due to the uncer-
tainty of both the markets themselves and their government support, and (b) benefits
to  exporters  of other  commodities  that  are  not  taken  into  account  by  individual
exporters.
By specifying a dynamic dual model of export supply, this study is able to provide
some insight into both of these questions. Using export data for four major commodities
(apples, almonds, grapes,  and wine) to a common  set of countries  over the  1984-94
period,  the empirical results fail to reject a multivariate  flexible accelerator  (MVFA)
specification, but the magnitudes of some results appear to be somewhat implausible.
Nevertheless, failing to reject the MVFA model means that promotion expenditure in
any given year may have effects that extend far into the future. However, commodity
associations have little incentive to take these future benefits into account in making
their promotion decisions because they have no way of ensuring they will have access
to the market.
Further, adjustments in the equity of one product can be either complementary or
can substitute for adjustments  in another.  Complementarity implies that building a
strong image for one product reinforces that of another,  so that promoting one will be
more effective the greater the accumulated stock of product equity in the other. These
inter-product spillovers, however, are rarely taken into account by exporters, their trade
associations,  or the FAS in its funding allocation decisions.
If these results can be corroborated with research using similar data, and perhaps
other methods, their implications can be far-reaching. First, these results provide some
initial evidence for two classes of market failure that have, in the past, been used as a
justification for public participation  in providing export promotion assistance.  If the
government is to continue this active role in export promotion, then future allocation
and funding decisions should address these external effects, since they are not likely to
be taken into account by private exporters and trade associations. However, our findings
also imply that private exporters have an incentive to develop alternative institutional
arrangements among themselves in order to internalize both the dynamic and cross-
commodity  benefits  to  promotion.  In the  first instance,  reducing  their reliance  on
government support for export promotion removes the policy uncertainty surrounding
the annual  re-funding  of export promotion  programs.  Second,  allocating  promotion
expenditures  among  products  through  multi-commodity  organizations  would  help
improve the efficiency of this allocation and possibly provide all growers a higher return
on their investment in foreign market development.
[Received December 1997; final revision received  April 1998.]
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